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Abstract—The Industrial Revolution has unveiled the 
development of global capitalism.  States, corporations and 
individuals are accumulating capital for desire. While 
consuming resource on earth, it is confirmed by IPCC in the 
4th evaluation report that human activities are the main 
reason for global warming. In the past decades, global 
warming has become the main important issue in international 
society. It reflects that the globe is undertaking a revolution, 
which takes low-carbon development as the core under the 
challenge climate risk and the security of resource. The states 
are confronting the decision paradox of the state's individual 
interest and the global public interest. Despite the fact that the 
state plays the main role in international anarchy society, it is 
obstructed by the lack of supra-nation organization to force 
the states to obey international regime. Therefore, it is difficult 
to solve the problem of collective action problem, free rider 
problem and dilemma of common aversions…etc. Those things 
will influence the result of environmental regime. The state or 
non-state actor reaches good outcome with systematic 
collaboration or cooperation. However, the governance trend 
of international systematic collaboration has usually ignored or 
weakened the aspect of power. During the process of global 
environmental governance, power may represent in multiple or 
sequent operational ways, or jump out of the role, which take 
nation as the main and traditional role to exercise power. 
Because the regime has compulsory problem, deviation, 
privilege of regime and unfair confined actions, studying 
multiple aspects of power operation during governance could 
help us understand the paradox of international cooperation in 
order to explore the chance of international cooperation. 
Keywords-climate change; global environmental governance; 
international regime ; power 
 
I.  INTRODUCTION  
The population has rapidly grown from 500 
million to 7 billion people since the industrial revolution. 
With the advance of technology, human beings produce 
enormous amounts of greenhouse gas like carbon 
dioxide, methane as a byproduct of development. 
Scientific evidence has shown that the main reason for 
the problems related to climate change, like the melting 
of glaciers, the rise of temperatures, El Nino, greenhouse 
effect and the food crisis, is human activities. Island 
countries which have carbon emission that are relatively 
low, such as Tuvalu and the Republic of Kiribati, are 
facing a crisis survival due to current sea level rise. Since 
1980, the average temperature around the globe has 
dramatically increased. The life cycle of carbon dioxide 
which is produced by human is about 50 to 250 years 
since 1970. Even if we stop every human activity, global 
warming will still last for a period of time. Taking action 
against climate change is of the greatest urgency in 
dealing with global warming trend. Therefore, an 
international institution on climate should be established 
in order to alleviate the crisis of global warming. The 
United Nations Framework Conference on Climate 
Change (UNFCCC) which is entered into force in 1994 
has as its aim calling nations to reduce the emission of 
greenhouse gas in response to the climate change 
problem. Except the Kyoto Protocol, which is formal and 
legally binding, and explicitly regulates the index of 
emission of carbon dioxide of the main industrial nations, 
other conferences of the parties can merely regulate on 
the basis of agreement. In December 2012, the Cancun 
Conference passed the Green Climate Fund plan, though 
the source of capital was unknown. In the November 
2012 of ”Doha Agreement”, there was a minor 
advance regarding the lager question of whether the 
carbon emission reduction called for by the Kyoto 
Protocol will succeed, and whether COP can reach a 
consensus on the issues of carbon emission reduction. 
Nevertheless, the Umbrella Group has exempted from the 
requirements of the agreement. Above all, when states 
are facing a global warming crisis which has urgent 
implications for human survival, why is global collective 
action so difficult to achieve? What kind of dilemma 
does global climate security governance confront when a 
state’s individual interest is contradicted by the 
international regime’s collective interest? 
To answer and clarify these research questions, the 
article first explores climate change and analyzes the 
status quo of carbon emission around the world. Under 
the global governance research approach, the article 
discusses governance paradoxes during the formation of 
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climate change regime: free riding, representative, 
accountability, transparency and participation. Under the 
function of strategy choice of state actor and 
international organization and non-governance 
organization, power can be view as a unit and form a new 
governance concept. These two concepts do not contrary 
to each other. The conclusion can examine the function 
of power into two concepts. One is the social relationship 
(the interaction of actor or the relationship of social 
regime). The other is the classification of social 
relationship (direct or diffuse), which is formed by four 
types of power. This concept applies to the approach of 
global governance. The article examines the chance of 
state cooperation from the case of global climate change 
conference. 
 
II. THE PROCESS ON CLIMATE CHANGE REGIME 
FORMATION 
Climate change has been viewed as an important 
environmental problem on global diplomatic stage. In the 
past two decades, the consistency of carbon dioxide has 
increased. The impact of climate change has become an 
international consensus. In terms of range, climate change 
regime is global and most members in international society 
are included. The legislative system in every state 
commonly focuses on the climate change. The highest 
leadership level (president and prime minister) has highly 
consensus and participation [1]. Therefore, it is important 
between state and non-state actor. The formation of 
horizontal governance structure indicates the concept of 
“the governance with government”, which reduces 
bureaucracy system and reach the goal of governance.  
United Nations Framework Convention on Climate 
Change (UNFCCC) also suggest that stability the 
consistency of carbon dioxide is important, which can 
prevent climate system from human interfere. In order to 
understand the problem of climate change, the following 
paragraph will discuss the formation and status quo of 
UNFCC, list the present amount of carbon emission around 
the world and recognize the real threat for human at the 
present from the global warming report from the 
Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change (IPCC). 
A. Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change（IPCC） 
Global warming and climate change are 
interchangeable terms. As a matter of fact, these two terms 
have some important distinctions. Global warming is the 
phenomena that can be easily observed from the annual 
average temperature over the past two centuries and the 
predicting temperature in the future; while climate change 
includes different aspects like precipitation, stability of 
climate and the frequency of extreme event. To prevent the 
aggravation of climate change, United Nations (UN) 
establishes Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change 
(IPCC), which is formed by World Meteorological 
Organization (WMO) and United Nations Environment 
Program (UNEP). It presents a climate change assessment 
report (AR) in average of 6 years. Until 2007, it has totally 
presented 4 global warming assessment Reports “table 1”. 
TABLE I.  THE GLOBAL WARMING REPORTS FROM IPCC. 
 Main content and Influence 
1st Climate Change  
Ensuring the science basis of climate 
change, which is beneficial to the formation 
of UNFCCC. The convention is legally 




Submitting to 2nd Conference of the parties 
(COP2) and contributing to the negotiation 




Including 3 working groups relevant to 
science basis, influence, adaptability and 
vulnerability, mitigation reports, and 
focusing on the integrated reports of science 
and technique. The report indicates that 





*1st Working Group (WG1): physical 
report. The average temperature of first 50 
years is warmer than 0.13 ℃ ; after the 
following 20 years, the temperature will 
increase in the speed of 0.2℃ per decade. 
Until 2100, the global temperature will 
increase from 1.1 to 6.4℃, and the sea level 
will rise 18 to 59 cm. 
*2nd Working Group (WG2): aiming at 
providing evidence that many nature 
systems are influenced by regional climate 
change, examining from influence, 
adaptability and vulnerability. Greenhouse 
effect will lead to the distinction of 1/3 of 
spices. The phenomena, such as famine and 
water shortage, will be more common. 
*3rd Working Group (WG3): a proposal 
about mitigating climate change and the 
limitation of the atmosphere concentrations 
of greenhouse gas in 445-650 ppm. 
Proposing inter-section cooperation, 
reciprocity and transaction. Government 
should reduce carbon emission before 2015. 
IPCC Assessment Report 1990、1995、2001、2007 
B. Process of global climate change regime formation 
During the period time of AR4, countries around the 
world were having negotiations. The UN establishes the 
institution of climate change, United Nations Framework 
Convention on Climate Change （UNFCCC）, which was 
drafted in 1992 and enter into force in 1994. The aim is to 
call for the stability of greenhouse gas emission. Until 2014, 
there are 194 members has accepted the convention’s 
regulation. UNFCCC has separated the members into 3 
categories. Members in Annex I should reduce the amounts 
of greenhouse gas emission to the standard in 1990. The 
developed countries in Annex Ⅱ should provide capital for 
the total cost brought by the obligation that the developing 
countries handling for global warming, and for the fund 
needed in technology transformation. Non-Annex I countries 
have no other promise regarding to the reducing amount of 
greenhouse emission, except providing statistic numbers of 
their country. 
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UNFCCC based on the convention of Article 7 has 
periodically convened Conferences of the Parties to evaluate 
the plans for handling climate change since 1995.  That 
UNFCCC has been through 16 conferences since the 1st 
conference in 1995. During the period of time, none of the 
countries in Annex I could reach the presuming goal of the 
reducing amount of carbon emission. COP3 has passed the 
Kyoto Protocol, which is legally binding in 2005 since the 
first negotiation in 1997. It explicitly regulates the goal of 
greenhouse gas emission for the EU and 37 industrial 
countries. During the period of promise, 2008-2012, Annex I 
countries should reduce 6 kinds of greenhouse gas emission 
at least 5% on the standard 1990. COP15 proposes that 
global temperature should keep in 2 degree Celsius range 
and requests that Annex I countries should propose their goal 
for reducing the amounts of greenhouse gas emission before 
January 2010. Their mitigation and finance should be 
monitored, reported and investigated. Non-Annex I countries 
should also proposed domestic mitigation plans and accept 
the international measurement of National Appropriate 
Mitigation Actions (NAMAs), report and investigation. 
Copenhagen Accord has also proposed to establish Green 
Climate Fund providing 300 billion dollars as additional 
assistant from 2010-2012, and provide 1000 US dollars for 
finance in 2020[2]. In general, the effect of Copenhagen 
Accord is only for politic declaration. 
The 2010 Cancun Accord (COP16) is the extension of 
Copenhagen Accord in 2009, providing private sectors a 
platform for performing the previous efforts for climate 
mitigation, especially in trade, investment and technology 
development. COP 16 held in Mexico Cancun is to 
compensate the insufficiency of Copenhagen Accord, 
declaring the members should carry out the promise. The 
accord made a resolution to establish Green Climate Fund to 
manage the capital of developed countries for assisting 
countries which suffer the most from climate change. 
Cancun Accord focuses on capitals, which will provide 1000 
billion US dollars for handling climate change problems per 
decade. Part of the capitals will be used for providing low-
interest loan and microcredit. However, the developed 
countries refuse to promise a concrete numbers, unless the 
developing countries explicitly explain how to use the 
money [3]. In addition, Cancun Accord (COP 16) merely 
calls on a vision for long-term cooperation with morals. 
Despite few of the Umbrella Group withdraw the promise 
(Japan, Russia, New Zealand, Canada and so on). COP 18 
has made the decision to postpone the second promise period 
to 2020. 
 
III. THE PRESENT SITUATION OF GLOBAL CARBON 
EMISSION 
The book, Six Degrees, written by Lynas, predicts that 
if the average temperature on earth rises 1 degree Celsius, 
the agriculture zone will undergo desertification and the 
coastal area close to sea level will be flooded; when rising 2 
degrees Celsius, one-third of all species will be threatened to 
death; if it is rising 6 degrees Celsius, human beings will 
need to be concerned about their own. At present, the 
average temperature on earth has risen 0.8 degree Celsius. 
Therefore, human beings should take action on mitigation 
measures to keep the temperature rise within the key 2 
degrees Celsius range. From 2009 to 2014, the top 10 
carbon-emitting countries (Fig.1) accounted for 61% of the 
total carbon dioxide (CO2). China and the US accounted for 
43%. Six of the ten countries are members of the 
Organization of Economy Cooperation and Development 
(OECD) 1. The developed countries accounted for the bulk 
of global carbon emissions. Under the condition of rapid 
economy growth, the emission of carbon dioxide around the 
world is expected to increase an average of 1.7% from 2007 
to 2035. For OECD countries, under the condition of rapid 
economic growth, the average increase is 0.5% per year; for 
non-OECD countries, the average increase is expected to be 
2.4% per year. Under the condition of low economic growth, 
from 2007 to 2035 the amount of carbon dioxide emission 
around the world will increase an average of 0.1% per year, 
with OECD countries accounted for -0.1% and non-OECD 
countries accounted for +1.6%[4]. 
 
Figure 1. Top 10 Carbon Dioxide Emitting Countries . (Raw Data collected  
from CO2 NOW.org website ) 
If we try to understand the present situation of carbon 
emission of members under the structure of UNFCCC, 
Annex I accounts for more than half of total carbon emission 
in 2009. From “Fig.2”, the total amounts of the world’s 
carbon emission from the top 10 countries of Annex I 
account for 45%. The US, EU and Japan are the most. 
Judging from the statistics, it will be a big challenge for 
developed countries to reduce their carbon emission back to 
the standard in 1990 with mitigation measures that is still not 
enough. In addition, from “Fig.3”, the top 10 countries of 
non-Annex I account for 40%. China and India account for 
30% of the world total carbon emission. It is clear that coal is 
main energy of carbon emission that increases the most. In 
short, the outcome for state to pursue of development 
represents the trend of the increasing amount of carbon 
dioxide, which reflects the important function of non-
OECD’s energy structure. Until 2035, China and India will 
account for 37% of the world total carbon emission. And 
China accounts for 31%[5]. 
                                                          
1 The US, Japan, Germany, Canada, Southern Korea and the UK. 
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★Actor’s dominant strategy 
★★Equilibrium Point   
Figure 2. Top 10 Carbon Dioxide Emitting Annex I Countries. (Raw Data 
collected  from CO2 NOW.org website ) 
    
Figure 3. Top 10 Carbon Dioxide Emitting UNFCCC Non-Annex I 
Countries. (Raw Data collected  from CO2 NOW.org website ) 
 
IV. PARADOX OF INTERNATIONAL COOPERATION UNDER 
GLOBAL ENVIRONMENTAL GOVERNANCE 
Climate change belongs to transnational issue. When 
the state takes self-interest as priority, the governance of 
climate change will face extreme challenge and governance 
crisis. The process of climate change formation is existing 
dilemmas. The following discourse discusses the dilemmas 
of state cooperation under climate change regime, such as 
free rider, representative, participation, accountability and 
transparency.  
A. Free rider  
Climate change is global problem. Global public 
problem is global public bads. Greenhouse gas contains the 
properties with globe and public bads, which is the obstacle 
for human to have or enjoy public goods (like carbon 
emission of a state) and the consequence is untaken by the 
whole. If every state takes self-interest as its priority, it is 
likely to have the condition of free rider. That is, the 
reduction of carbon emission from other states can obtain 
more interest for the self. In specific situation, the public 
goods become typical prisoner’s dilemma. In order to obtain 
the interest of non-exclusive goods, sub-optimal provision 
originates from the incentive for individual to be a free rider 
[6]. We draw the prisoner’s dilemma as “ Fig.4 ” . 
Compared with A2B2, two actors prefer the result of A1B1, 
but the result is not reliable and not able to obtain 
individually. In order to achieve Pareto-optimal result, two 
actors need to avoid dominant strategy. When independent 
decision making causes Pareto-deficient equilibrium, all the 
actors prefer the other equilibrium, which will result in 
dilemma of common interests due to the pursuit of common 
interest. Therefore, the result mutual cooperation is not 
equilibrium. Two actors can immediately acquire a better 
result by cheating.  
When the actors’ common expectation is not Pareto-
optimal result, dilemma of common interest will come up. In 
order to resolve the dilemma and ensure Pareto-optimal 
result, two actors must cooperate with each other, and solve 
the regime of dilemmas of common interests with strict 
behavior pattern to ensure no one is cheating. When the 
individual does not have advantages on having more 
contributions, everyone will decide to be a free rider in the 
equilibrium world. The result is worse than the world that 
public goods are equal contribution. To break the dilemma, 
the convention of mutual cooperation with international 
regime is needed. 
Figure 4. Prisoners’ dilemma 
 
B. Representative and Participation 
The global environmental degradation has no 
boundaries. The trait emerges in many international areas 
without regimes and methods to control sovereign states’ 
actions. Therefore, international cooperation to gain the 
effect of internalization is needed. The alliance groups 
related to UNFCCC have emerged, mainly including 
Organization for Economic Co-operation and Development 
(OECD), a handy way of describing Japan, the US, 
Switzerland, Canada, Australia, Norway and New Zealand, 
the negotiating bloc for the non-EU developed countries. If 
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we add Russia, we can call them the Umbrella Group 
(JUSSCANNZ), European Union, Group of 772 , China, the 
Alliance of Small Island States (AOSIS), Organization of 
Petroleum Exporting Countries (OEPC) and Central 
American Group.  From“Fig.5”, that OECD nations and 
JUSSCANNZ3  accounted for the most in the total amount 
of carbon emission in these 7 national groups, and AOSIS 
accounts for the least. Therefore, in terms of climate change, 
OECD has nothing to do but gradually reduce the carbon 
emission of industry. Therefore, in terms of climate change, 
OECD has nothing to do but gradually reduce the carbon 
emission of industry. 
Figure 5. Carbon dioxide emissions of major world unions (Raw Data 
collected  from CO2 NOW.org website) 
 
During the negotiation of climate change regime, the 
hegemony of China and the U.S dominates the agenda of 
negotiation to ensure its biggest interests, which leads the 
negotiation to G2 framework. AOSIS and Least Developed 
Countries (LDC), which suffer the most from global 
warming crisis, fall to be a sacrifice under the framework of 
great countries, which makes people to question about the 
representative of UNFCCC. There are 194 members 
participate in UNFCCC, a N-person dilemma, which causes 
the negotiation either hardly to have common ground or 
form dilemma of common aversions. Therefore, the 
coordination of climate change regime is needed to enhance 
the effectiveness of global climate governance.  
1) Dilemma of N-person games  
Under the premise that nations will cooperate with 
each other in anarchy, take N-person games as an example, 
Kenneth A. Oye explains, when the agents increase, the 
dilemma of trade cost, information cost, the possibility of 
                                                          
2  Group of 77: A group designed to promote its members' collective 
economic interests and create an enhanced joint negotiating capacity in the 
United Nations, funded in 1964. 
 
3  Formed by non-EU industrial states. They members usually gather 
together to discuss issues for common consensus. Members include 
Australia, Canada, Iceland, Japan, New Zealand, Norway, Russia and the 
U.S. The organization was formed during COP4, which supports to reach 
the goal of reduction of greenhouse gas by transaction. 
 
betray and problem control will increase as well. The 
nations can reduce the number of agents for cooperation. In 
the condition of the cooperation dilemma brought by N-
person game, establishing international institution can 
reduce the possibility of non-cooperation[7]. 
If we want to decrease the negotiation representatives 
for increasing the possibility of cooperation between nations, 
we can elect negotiation representative from 194 members. 
However, if we reduce the representative from 194 to 7 
under the 7 interest alliance groups mentioning before, the 
dilemma to reach a common ground still exists. From chart 6, 
we can observe that the OECD and JUSSCANNZ accounts 
for the most of the total amounts of carbon emission from 7 
national groups, and The Alliance of Small Island States 
(AOSIS) account for the least4. The external contradiction of 
7 interest alliances from different interest is the domestic 
adjustment cost brought by industry change if the alliances 
emitting the most choose to cooperate in mitigation. 
Furthermore, each alliance has different internal 
contradictions under the degree of economic development. 
2) Dilemma of common aversions  
The members’ position on the negotiation of climate 
convention is so different that clashes with each other. 
Southern states put emphasis on national development than 
carbon emission. Northern states do not emphasize 
historical responsibility but grandfather law, which require 
the newly emerging developing countries to set standards 
for reducing carbon emission. Take the U.S as an example. 
If China does not accept international supervision and insist 
on self-audit, the U.S are either not willingly to keep 
promise for reducing carbon emission or providing climate 
funds. In precondition that everyone is afraid of global 
warming, this negotiation position for “neither you nor me” 
is the game for dilemma of common aversions and common 
indifference. We can observe from “Fig.6” that there are 
two equilibriums for dilemma of common aversions and 
common indifference: A1B1 and A2B2. If the actors have 
contingent Strategies and act simultaneously, they cannot be 
certain that they will arrive at one of these outcomes if they 
act independently and simultaneously [8]. Without 
coordination, they may well end up with one of the 
outcomes that they neither wants due to divergent interests 
and not care about the emergence of two equilibriums. The 
specific outcome for common aversions is easy to deal with. 
To deal with dilemma of common aversions, the common 
interest for both sides lies in regime and not acting 
independently, which aims to acquire a convergence of their 
expectations and makes coordination possible as well as 
resolve the dilemma of independent decision making.  
                                                          
4 The formation of non-EU industrial countries usually gather together to 
seek for common consensus. Members include Australia, Canada, Iceland, 
Japan, New Zealand, Norway, Russia, and the US, which agree with trade 
action for reducing greenhouse gas emissions. The organization was form 
in COP4. 
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Figure 6. Dilemma of common aversions and common indifference 
 
Environmental NGOs advocate to against global 
warming with multiple ways in order to conduct the duty of 
anti-global warming and accomplish the mission of 
organizations as the environment citizen. The World Wide 
Views on Global Warming was held in September, 2009. 
Through global media strategy and the discussion and 
participation of global warming issue, more than 40 states, 
4000 citizens had expectations on neo climate convention 
correspond to justice and influenced the decision-making of 
global environment [9].  World Wild Foundation advocates 
state leaders have fair, justified and legally binding global 
climate convention and emphasizes that developed countries 
and developing countries should take action together in order 
to deal with climate change. It submits the proposal to the 
secretariat of UNFCCC. 
In 2008, COP 14 had advance in Reducing emissions 
from deforestation and forest degradation (REDD), including 
consenting to hold seminar related to issues like estimation 
and monitor of the carbon emission from deforestation and 
degradation of forest, national and local monitor and report 
system, the methodology of forest resource on the ground 
and remote measure and finance incentives. It agreed to take 
aboriginal opinions as reference and provide opportunity for 
full and effective participation. However, many aboriginal 
communities complaint that their rights were not be 
guaranteed. 
During the convention on Copenhagen, countries or 
groups without qualification are lack of opportunities to 
express themselves, which is against to UNFCCC Article 4.1  
that encourage the widest participation in this process, 
including that of non-governmental organizations. Global 
climate governance should combine public sector with 
private sector and the third sector, which will form as The 
Governance Triangle, proposed by Kenneth W. Abbott and 
Bertrand Schneider[10].It will become an interactive climate 
governance network. Private sector (market and Multi-
National Corporations) and the third sector (civil society and 
NGOs) should present their opinions to the public sector 
through normal negotiation. The equations are an exception 
to the prescribed specifications of this template. You will 
need to determine whether or not your equation should be 
typed using either the Times New Roman or the Symbol font 
(please no other font). To create multileveled equations, it 
may be necessary to treat the equation as a graphic and insert 
it into the text after your paper is styled. 
C. Accountability and Transparency 
Accountability and transparency are like two sides of a 
coin, which is necessary for good governance. 
Accountability responds to the obligation and expectation 
requested by the regime. Mulgan defined accountability as 
“being effected by privilege and interest.” responsibility 
refers that power has space to display and is only willing to 
take responsibility for the self. Accountability refers to ask 
those who have the power to explain their behavior 
[11].Accountability can be explained by laws and 
administrative procedures. Define explicit responsibility and 
obligation; cooperate with mechanism of punishment and 
amendment. Conference of the parties (COP) have consensus 
on preventing climate change and take actions to reduce 
emissions of greenhouse gases, which is in accordance with 
the basic rules of UNFCCC Article3: differentiated 
responsibilities5 and the principle of fairness 6. 
The core problem for Copenhagen convention lies in 
having common ground on common but differentiated 
responsibilities. Compared with the U.S and Umbrella Group 
, European countries are more willing to take historic 
responsibility, emphasize on the assist for least-developed 
countries to adapt climate change. BASIC countries, 
including Brazil, South-Africa, India, China, focus on the 
right for the development of countries. Without legally 
binding commitment, it turns out in the increasing amount of 
carbon emission. During the negotiation, China has been 
seen as an obstacle. The Copenhagen Accord promised to 
provide 30 billion US dollars for developing countries 
against climate change. The concession of China lies in the 
practice of the promise . China strongly insists on the 
economic development and reminds the historic 
responsibility of developed countries to take a lead to reduce 
carbon emission. Greenpeace USN indicates that the 
cumulative amount of carbon emissions in the U.S is 2.4 
times higher than China during 1960 to 2005. The former 
prime minister of China, Wen Jia Bao strictly pointed that 
developed countries must take the responsibility for 80% of 
                                                          
5 UNFCCC Article 3.1：The Parties should protect the climate system for 
the benefit of present and future generations of humankind, on the basis of 
equity and in accordance with their common but differentiated 
responsibilities and respective capabilities. Accordingly, the developed 
country Parties should take the lead in combating climate change and the 
adverse effects thereof. 
6 UNFCCC Article 3.2：The specific needs and special circumstances of 
developing country Parties, especially those that are particularly vulnerable 
to the adverse effects of climate change, and of those Parties, especially 
developing country Parties, that would have to bear a disproportionate or 
abnormal burden under the Convention, should be given full consideration. 
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the amount of carbon emission since industrial revolution on 
Copenhagen climate change conference[12]. The China’s 
negotiation representative insists the position on the core 
principle of common but differentiated responsibilities. 
Common responsibility refers that every country should be 
dedicated to national, regional and global environmental 
protection; differentiated responsibilities refer to the 
consideration of different conditions in different countries, 
especially for the historic responsibilities and the capability 
of protection, reduction and control. For example, the 
developing countries like the U.S can undertake the 
commitment to set a higher goal for the reduction of carbon 
emission than developing countries. 
The distinction of responsibility and capability involves 
with actors who cause global warming and actors who have 
resources to correct the result. UNFCCC Article 3  rules that 
the Parties have a right to, and should, promote sustainable 
development, which also refers to “the right for normal 
development”. If the party does not practice the right of 
development, the proposal can be viewed as illegal. 
Therefore, the developing countries also have the 
responsibility to pursue sustainable developing path for 
environment with the goal to comply with the economy, 
social development and eliminate poverty. From the 
perspective of economic development, in order to maintain 
the privileged lifestyle of developing countries, it is unfair 
for poor countries to pay for the price, which may delay the 
development [13]. Providing permission for the poor 
countries to emit carbon dioxide during the development 
may be easier to accept. In terms of the society and economy 
development of least-development countries, there is no 
practical approach except accepting carbon emission. 
The concept of differentiated capability reflects on the 
concept that the parties with different economy development 
standard and income should have differentiated contribution 
for climate change. Darrel Moellendorf argued that 
UNFCCC should regulate acceptable range of distribution 
negotiation for reducing the burden of climate change. The 
industrial countries should take more burdens. Therefore, 
with the policy promoting and protecting poor countries 
economy development and reach the moral goal to eliminate 
poverty, UNFCCC should be legally binding in international 
laws. UNFCCC advocates the approach of equal burden and 
the burden equalization of reducing carbon emission. The 
parties (with the same environmental countries) should put 
the effort to take equal burdens. If not permitting developing 
countries continues to increase the amount of carbon 
emission, it is contradicted to equal burdens. Martino Traxler 
defended for equal burden and argued that the equal burden 
to reduce the amount of carbon dioxide is prior to the request 
for the ratio of every state that is advocated by international 
climate convention [14]. “Per capita emission” and “mixed 
per capita and grandfather law”  is the present acceptable 
principle for most countries. If every country is requested to 
reduce the emission that is proportional to the history of 
global emission process and the total demand to compensate 
the total emission of poor countries, it seems to comply with 
UNFCCC’s three regulations that emphasize on the 
development right and the burden distribution of 
responsibility on the basis of different responsibility and 
capability.  
Transparency can be defined as the process of the 
unveiling personal information, which is across the range of 
international regime and the new practice standard for 
national action [15]. transparency can be view as the utility 
of that is based on regime theory and related to institution 
information. The negotiation action for institution supporters 
reconstructs the confidence for people who are afraid to be a 
fool because they obey the regulation, as well as provides 
necessary information for negotiation correction [16]. 
Transparency can be viewed as organizational principles of 
the formation of global governance structure in the following 
and the same period of time. When organizational principles 
embed in social practice and is viewed as legally binding and 
institutional, it is important for governance. In other words, 
when the international institution becomes more transparent, 
it can encourage the necessary negotiation and cooperation 
between countries and practice the convention of climate 
change. 
In early 1990s, environmental design, environmental 
label, environmental report and environmental audit have 
played important roles in global environmental governance 
structure. Environmental audit includes environmental 
accounting (EA) and environmental management systems 
(EMS), which are important tools to strengthen the 
transparency of environmental effects and encourage new 
technology for improving environmental effects. The 
importance of transparency of global environment 
governance is beyond the practice of environmental treaty 
[17]. The following paragraphs will discuss about the 
institution of emission trade and environmental management. 
We need climate change institutions and establish the 
ability for developing counties to deal with climate change, 
especially for those fragile countries, which needs financial 
resources and technical transfer. Adaption fund is an 
arrangement. COP14 in 2008 decided to start adaption fund. 
The source is from clean development mechanism (CDM) in 
the Kyoto Protocol’s Article 12, which is the complete 
climate financial institution for UNFCCC structure. It 
consents to provide legal position for adaption fund board 
and finance developing countries to promote climate change 
adaption. Global Environment Facility (GEF) is the 
Secretariat. World Bank is the trustee of the fund. The 
arrangement is temporary. It will be examined on the basis of 
3 years. CDM, developed by Kyoto Protocol, has permitted 
developed countries to invest in developing countries to 
reduce carbon emission in order to compensate the carbon 
credit limits promised by Kyoto Protocol for developed 
countries. It will increase the same carbon credit limit for 
Annex I countries, which will not reduce the carbon 
emission in concrete but violet the global additional 
principle. Therefore, the present CDM has to redesign the 
climate change institution on environmental and economy 
efficiency. The Article 6 on Kyoto Protocol regulates the 
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joint implementation (JI), which makes Annex I countries to 
examine and transfer/gain reducing carbon emission unit 
under the supervision of the Supervisory Committee. The 
Emission Trade (ET) on Article 17 only limits to the 
countries listing in appendix B in Kyoto Protocol.  
The Framework Convention on Climate Change 
requests the parties to provide national communications to 
make the information interactive and transparency. COP5 in 
1999 has passed Guidelines for Annex I National 
Communications and demanded Annex I countries provide 
the guidelines since 2000. The Framework Convention on 
Climate Change sets a non-Annex I national communication 
group to improve the national communication of non-Annex 
I countries and examine the authority range of the group in 
COP 7. No matter Annex I or non-Annex I, its members 
include three parts: total greenhouse gas emission and 
remove detailed list, steps for implementation on convention 
and the information to reach the goal of convention.  
COP 7 in 2001 has established the compliance 
committee, which has 2 branches of facilitative and 
enforcement. If the country does not obey the treaty, the 
punishments include eliminating 1.3 amount of emission 
credit limit for next permitting period, suspending the 
qualification for emission trade and planning for complying 
action. COP 13 in 2007 passed Bali Action Plan. For 
developed countries, the adequate action for carbon emission 
reduction includes quantification of emission limits and the 
reduction goal; for developing countries, the action includes 
carbon emission reduction under the premise that developing 
countries can continue to develop economy and gain profit 
and participate adequate action of greenhouse gas 
environmental audit mechanism that is measurable, 
reportable and verifiable under the structure of technology 
and capital. The China’s mediation goal is that the amount of 
greenhouse gas emission per unit of GDP in 2020 can reduce 
by 40-45% than 2005. Despite the fact that China promises 
to mediation in volunteer, it insists on self-examine rather 
international one, which is a discrepancy in two countries 
and the biggest obstacle for the implement on climate change. 
 
V. GOVERNANCE NEEDS POWER 
During the implement of the Framework Convention 
on climate, we can understand that the effect of global 
climate change governance will be influenced by the 
phenomenon of free-rider, representative, participation and 
accountability and transparency during the negotiation and 
cooperation of states. In anarchy international society, 
sovereign states are no longer able to handle global public 
problem alone. When international regime cannot regulate 
the parties with power, can global governance provide a 
solution? 
Realism considers power as material, which is not able 
to deal with existing regulation or cultural issue. Realism 
cannot explain why powerful states are able to be convinced 
by obey the rule, and how weak states reach their hopeful 
politic results by norms. Neo-liberalism emphasizes on the 
important of institution, but focus on the material profit 
rather than norms. If we review Peace of Westphalia, we can 
find that international politic problems are not fully be 
solved by norms. The strategic negotiation or evaluation on 
politic risk can overwhelm the norms. If the politic idea 
becomes the result of risk evaluation, the reason for neo-
liberalism that states join international organization lacks the 
context of norms while constraining states' action. 
Structuralism aims at the process of regulating structure and 
implementation. However, it is not able to explain how 
politics and norms connect together. In sum, we can infer 
that power cannot be depicted by single theory.  
Power can also be seen as a unit and come up with a 
new governance concept. Whether the process of power is by 
external power interaction or internal social norms, we 
should examine “power to” and “power over”. “Power over” 
refers that power leads the actor. “Power to” refers that the 
regulation between actors decides what to do 7  . Michael 
Barnett and Raymond Duvall separate power in two sectors. 
One is that power works through social relationship 
(interaction between agents or relationship in mechanism 
society) the other is that the four types of power formed by 
social relationship categories (direct or diffuse) after power 
works. The viewpoint adds to the approach of global 
governance. See as “Fig.7”:  








Figure 7 Taxonomy of power 
Source: Michael Barnett and Raymond Duvall,“ Power in Global 
Governance，" in Power in Global Governance, eds. Michael Barnett 
and Raymond Duvall (New York: Cambridge University press,2005), 
p12. 
 
Compulsory power permit an agent directly shapes the 
situation or action for the other agent. This type of power 
seems to the definition by Michael Dahl, which refers that A 
has the ability to force B to do what A wants and B 
completely accepts the order and practices it. 
                                                          
7 Robert Dahl focuses on the recognition and observation of power as well 
as the connection between agents. The rest will understand indirect contact 
and the diffuse of social relationship. Compared with form one, the later 
has wider approach to analyze the position of power in social regulation. 
The relationship between power and regulation includes the formation of 
creating rules and direction, which are the key to decide whether agents can 
influence other agents, even though the result is not intended or necessarily 
created by institution. 
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Institutional power refers that the controlling activity of 
agent is indirect, which is through a formal or informal 
institution to adjust the social relationship between A and B. 
For example, under the rule and the procedure of the 
institution, A decides the guidelines for power implement 
among other but A does not have full decision power. 
Structure power refers that power between agents is 
regulated by each other under the structure. Structure decides 
the direction of agent in social relationship. Different from 
compulsory power, structural power is passive. That is, the 
existence of A is due to the existence of B in the structure 
which is effective. Productive power refers that the social 
ability of an agent is the production of society. However, the 
process forms the self-understandings of an agent and he 
realizes the existence of profit. The process is indirect and 
power it produces is the regulation for any issue in the 
society. 
Global environmental governance includes four types 
of power implementation “ Fig.8 ” . Because the 
international social structure formed by strong and weak 
states, compulsory power and structural power has become 
the direct power of state and non-state actors, which makes 
194 sovereign states be willing to have consensus and 
establish the regime on climate change. It is the importance 
of institution for international cooperation that neo-liberalism 
has emphasized. The institution can provide incentive for 
states to understand that the interest for cooperation is better 
than defend, and neo-realism emphasizes the influence of 
international structure on states’ actions. If the strong states 
are positively against climate change, it can enhance the 
willingness of the weak states to participate. During the 
formation of regime on climate change, global public goods 
are the results we share after solving the global 
environmental problem. Global environmental problem is the 
obstacle for human to share global public goods because the 
environment does not have exclusive public goods. To 
prevent the dilemma of free-rider, the international norms 
that is acceptable by every state, which is in the premise that 
the international society establishes trust, form social capital 
and create path dependence. It is the function of productive 
power. Non-state actors can produce institutional power and 
take the responsibility and solve the environmental problems 
together through transnational advocacy network and 
agenda-setting, which influences the sovereign states to 
accept the regulation automatically from bottom-up. It is 
what structuralism has emphasized that the states action will 
eventually transform through internal process, which will 
influence the action direction for the states’ interaction as 








Global environmental governance, a new problem-
solving and analyzing approach, meet the multiple and core 
characteristics of global environmental problem and fulfill 
the operating request through the cooperation and multiple 
controlling approaches between actors. Many non-national 
actors play vital role in these approaches. Research, data 
collection, analysis or supervising rely on the cooperation 
between national and non-national agents. Therefore, the 
aspect of power changes from traditional topside-down type 
to different layers. Power is a product impossible to exist 
alone but produced by social relations. The process of 
international relationship will efficiently shape the actor’s 
ability. The ability can decide the actor’s destiny and 
situation. 
Governance needs power, which is not contradicted to 
each other. The problem of climate change fundamentally 
changes the global power relationship. Through negotiation 
and cooperation, the state can redefine the state interest and 
recognize joint gains in the complex and reliable 
international environment. The actor realizes that the 
individual’s maximum profit is not equal to collective profit. 
Under the consensus of “common but differentiated” 
principle, if the developed countries can see the value that 
moderates the negotiation, it is possible to attract developing 
countries (especially for those rapid economic growing 
countries which produce great amount of carbon dioxide) 
and provide more space for them to bargain, which is a 
representation of international social structural power. 
Global environmental governance focuses on efficient 
governance of accountability, participation and transparency, 
which indicates the important or the participation of non-
state actors. The actors internalize environmental value, 
make the state actors get rid of the sovereign right and secure 
factor, accept the norms and have the consensus for 
collective action. Finally, it is possible to reach the goal of 
good governance in global environmental governance.  
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